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The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Why the Qualified
Individual Analysis Is the New Battleground for
Employment Discrimination Suits
I. Introduction
It is a well-accepted principle in our modern society that individuals
should not suffer discrimination in the workplace on account of their
disabilities. Congress sought to support this ideal by passing the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 After the Supreme Court handed
down narrowing constructions of what constitutes a “disability” near the
turn of the twenty-first century,2 Congress breathed new life into the ADA
through enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008 (Amendments Act).3 Now, nearly five years after the Amendments
Act first became effective on January 1, 2009,4 concrete patterns have
finally emerged from federal court opinions interpreting its major changes.
These results provide an exciting look at the Amendments Act’s effect and
a glimpse of its future implications in the employment context.
The most astonishing consequence of the Amendments Act is its
expansion of the definition of a disability. Because a plaintiff must prove
that she is disabled as an element of her prima facie claim,5 such an
1. Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2012)).
2. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(4), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by
statute, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
3. 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)). Some scholars refer
to this Amendment as the “ADAAA.” See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a
Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1564 (2014).
Although there is no substantive difference between these different monikers, this Comment
primarily uses the phrase “Amendments Act” for its perceived ease of reading.
4. § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. Though the Amendments Act became effective January 1,
2009, most federal courts of appeals agree that it does not apply retroactively and, therefore,
applies only to discriminatory conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. See Shin v.
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 369 F. App’x 472, 478 n.14 (4th Cir. 2010); Becerril v. Pima
Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009); Thornton v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 34 n.3 (1st Cir. 2009); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
569 F.3d 562, 565-67 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469
n.8 (5th Cir. 2009).
5. See McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL
1227154, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012) (citing EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d
1028, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 2011)).
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expansion reflects a major change in all disability discrimination suits. In
response to the congressional indication that the initial determination of
whether an employee is disabled “should not demand extensive analysis,”6
courts applying the Amendments Act almost always find that an
employee’s impairment “substantially limits one or more [of her] major life
activities.”7 In fact, as a result of the Amendments Act, courts often assume
the presence of a disability when there is a close call on whether the
employee’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.8 This
failure to provide an individualized assessment of the limiting nature of a
person’s impairment undermines the importance of the threshold question
under the original ADA: whether the employee is disabled.9
Ultimately, this Comment addresses the overexpansion of the definition
of a disability and shows how the determination of whether an employee is
a qualified individual under the ADA has become the major battleground in
disability discrimination suits. Part II outlines the basic statutes and
regulations that govern employment discrimination suits brought under the
ADA. Part III shows that the qualified individual analysis has become the
key inquiry in disability discrimination suits and explores the practical
effects of this change on employment practices. To illustrate the
Amendments Act in action, Part III also uses an empirical study to illustrate
that plaintiffs’ chances of surviving summary judgment are much higher
under the Amendments Act than under the original ADA. Part IV contends
that the Amendments Act has gone too far in expanding who qualifies as
disabled under the ADA, explores the interpretational problems that have
arisen under the Amendments Act, and offers suggestions for the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to resolve these problems
where possible. Finally, Part V considers what precedential value survives
from pre-Amendments Act case law in light of the significant reform
brought about by the Amendments Act.

6. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
8. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Ivey v. First Quality Retail Serv., 490 F. App’x 281, 285 (11th Cir. 2012);
see also Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2014).
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II. Disability Discrimination Framework Provided by Congress and the
EEOC
Employers and practitioners are often plagued by their misunderstanding
of the major employment revisions in Title I of the Amendments Act.10 In
order to understand what employers’ responsibilities are under the Act, one
must first appreciate the basic structure of the ADA and the hierarchy of
authority that Congress established under it. The principal provision of the
ADA forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”11 An employer will also be liable for failing to make
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” unless the employer can
establish that the accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business.”12
Under either avenue of liability, the ADA instructs that a court’s
determination of whether a person is disabled under the ADA requires an
“individualized assessment”—not a presumption.13 In order to establish a
prima facie claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) is a disabled
person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable
accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or
desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employer or prospective
employer on the basis of that disability.”14
A. Statutory Definition of a “Disability”
There are three types of disabilities under the ADA, and a plaintiff can
proceed under any one or combination of them.15 Under the ADA, a person
10. See, e.g., Saley v. Caney Fork, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837, 849-52 (M.D. Tenn.
2012) (where the employer suffered from a basic misunderstanding of the changes to the
“regarded as” prong made by the Amendments Act). Although a substantial portion of the
ADA was directed at public services (Title II) and public accommodations (Title III), this
Comment focuses on disability law in the employment context under Title I of the ADA,
which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2012).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
12. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014).
14. McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL
1227154, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012) (depicting a common formulation of the prima
facie claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2).
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is disabled if he (1) has a “physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities”; (2) has “a record of such an
impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment (as
described in paragraph (3)).”16 Paragraph 3, which was not introduced until
the passage of the Amendments Act, explains that a person claiming that
she has been “regarded as” disabled must only prove that an employer
discriminated against her “because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity.”17
Although Congress did not define “major life activities” within the
Amendments Act, it created a nonexhaustive list of major life activities,
including “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”18
According to the Amendments Act, major life activities also encompass the
operation of major bodily functions, including the “functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”19 The
Amendments Act’s inclusion of major bodily functions as “major life
activities” is a brand new component of the ADA analysis and was intended
to provide coverage for chronic impairments that can be substantially
limiting.20
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). These are commonly referred to, respectively, as the
“actual disability” prong, the “record of” prong, and the “regarded as” prong. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(g)(2).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). Although a plaintiff no longer must
prove that the employer perceives her impairment as limiting a major life activity, there is at
least a temporal limitation on plaintiffs proceeding under the “regarded as” prong. Those
bringing claims under this prong cannot succeed if the impairment is both transitory and
minor. Id. § 12102(3)(B) (explaining that a transitory impairment is one “with an actual or
expected duration of 6 months or less”). EEOC regulations reinforce that an employee can
still succeed under the “regarded as” prong even if his perceived impairment is transitory or
minor, so long as it is not both. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). Thus, an individual perceived
to suffer from an extremely minor impairment could typically survive the summary
judgment stage, so long as her impairment lasts longer than six months. See id.; Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. §
1630.2(l) (2014).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
19. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
20. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (2014) (listing HIV infection and cirrhosis of the liver
caused by Hepatitis B as chronic impairments that affect major bodily functions).
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The ADA (revised by the Amendments Act) provides the basic
framework for determining whether someone is disabled. The principal
command of the Amendments Act is that the definition of disability should
be construed “in favor of broad coverage of individuals,” and “[t]he term
‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and
purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”21 Furthermore, an
impairment need only substantially limit one major life activity,22 and “[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”23 Lastly, in rejecting
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,24
Congress explained that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,”25 except for the “mitigating
measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.”26 Thus, under the
Amendments Act’s changes, the disability determination must be made in
the broadest sense possible—both the concept of a “major life activity” and
the circumstances where an individual’s impairment “substantially limits” a
major life activity have been dramatically expanded.
B. EEOC Regulations and Interpretive Guidance
Congress entrusted a great deal of the ultimate decision-making power to
the EEOC by granting it authority “to issue regulations implementing the
definition[] of disability in Section 12102 of [the ADA].”27 Accordingly,
the EEOC dedicated a substantial portion of its ADA regulations to
defining what “substantially limits” a major life activity.28 The EEOC
divided most of its guidance into two distinct parts: (1) specific regulations
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)-(B).
22. Id. § 12102(4)(C).
23. Id. § 12102(4)(D).
24. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012).
26. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii).
27. Id. § 12205a. Although Congress also granted the authority to issue regulations to
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation, the EEOC regulations are the most
comprehensive set of guidelines and are tailored exclusively for disability discrimination
suits brought under Title I of the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b) (2012) (stating that
covered entities under the EEOC regulations are employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, or joint labor management committees).
28. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)-(5) (outlining what impairments will almost always substantially
limit a major life activity).
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that mirror and further elaborate upon the statutes implementing the
Amendments Act,29 and (2) the Interpretive Guidance appended after the
regulations.30
The starting point for the disability analysis is determining what
constitutes an impairment—only then can a court decide whether that
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. EEOC regulations
define a physical or mental impairment as “(1) [a]ny physiological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more body systems, . . . or (2) [a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such
as an intellectual disability . . . , organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”31
EEOC regulations elaborate upon the disability analysis in several ways.
For example, the EEOC has added several major life activities and major
bodily functions to the nonexhaustive lists created by the Amendments
Act.32 In addition, the EEOC resolved a circuit split by concluding that
employers are not required to provide accommodations to employees who
claim a disability “solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong.”33 Furthermore, the
regulations include fairly substantial coverage of the “regarded as” prong to
supplement the Amendments Act’s revision of this prong.34
EEOC regulations promulgated soon after the original ADA was passed
also clarify the second prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie claim, adding a
second element that a plaintiff must meet in order to be deemed a “qualified

29. Id. §§ 1630.1-1630.16.
30. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. (2014).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
32. Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (adding sitting, reaching, and interacting with others to the list
of major life activities); id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (adding special sense organs, skin,
genitourinary, cardiovascular, hemic, lymphatic, and musculoskeletal functions to the list of
major bodily functions).
33. Id. § 1630.9(e). Before the adoption of the Amendments Act, the federal circuits
were split regarding whether employees claiming that they were regarded as disabled
deserved reasonable accommodations. See Ryan v. Columbus Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc.,
No. 7:10–CV–234–BR, 2012 WL 1230234, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2012). Compare
Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
there is no duty to accommodate an individual who is regarded as having a disability), and
Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same), with Kelly v. Metallics
W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675-76 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that there is a duty to
accommodate an individual who is regarded as having a disability), and Williams v. Phila.
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).
34. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(g)(3), (j)(2), (l).
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individual” with a disability.35 In addition to being capable of performing
the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable
accommodation, the EEOC also instructs that an employee must possess
“the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position” she holds or desires.36
The Interpretive Guidance contains analysis found in neither the
Amendments Act nor the EEOC regulations. For example, the Interpretive
Guidance is now the only place that explains when an individual is
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, even though that
discussion was included in the regulations prior to the Amendments Act.37
The EEOC removed this discussion from the regulations because, in light of
the expanded list of major life activities, the EEOC concluded plaintiffs
would need to rely on using the major life activity of working “in only very
targeted situations.”38 Additionally, the Interpretive Guidance provides the
reasoning behind the various decisions made by the EEOC and makes
several references to the goals articulated by Congress in the legislative
history of the Amendments Act.39 Because the Interpretive Guidance
contains the most thorough analysis of the recent changes to the ADA,
practitioners and employers must reference it to thoroughly grasp all of the
applicable rules under the Amendments Act. Of course, now that the
Amendments Act and accompanying regulations have become effective in
most new cases, the force of the new statutes, regulations, and Interpretive
Guidance is slowly playing itself out in court.
III. The Departure from Disability Analysis and Shift in Focus to Job
Qualifications
While plaintiffs fare much better under the Amendments Act in proving
that they are disabled, recent case law suggests that courts are nonetheless
more frequently granting summary judgment to employers because
plaintiff-employees are not “qualified individuals” within the meaning of
the ADA.40 This result could be attributable to the fact that although
Congress significantly expanded the definition of disability under the
Amendments Act, the second and third elements of an employee’s prima

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2014).
Id.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (2014).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(5) and (6).
See, e.g., id. § 1630.2(j)(1).
See infra Part III.A.1-2.
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facie claim have remained largely untouched.41 As alluded to previously,
the plaintiff still bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating all three prima
facie elements.42
Due to the increased importance of the qualified individual analysis,
written job descriptions now play a vital role in a court’s determination of
whether an employee can adequately perform his job in spite of having a
disability. This shift in focus that Congress spurred will force employers to
update their written job descriptions to reflect the key expectations of their
employees. But has Congress also created a perverse incentive for
employers to screen out potentially disabled individuals in the hiring
process?
A. Developments in the Case Law Interpreting the Amendments Act
There has been an outpouring of scholarly literature predicting how the
Amendments Act would affect ADA discrimination suits.43 Only recently,
though, have opinions interpreting the Amendments Act materialized in
case law.44 Analyzing some of these cases will illustrate the trends
developing in the aftermath of the Amendments Act. In order to portray
these developments, I gathered statistics for the success rate of ADA
plaintiffs at the summary judgment phase of employment discrimination

41. As noted above, the plaintiff has the burden of proving he (1) has a disability; (2) is
a qualified individual; and (3) suffered discrimination on the basis of his disability.
McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012). One minor alteration must be noted. The Amendments Act
changed the third prima facie element so that it now prohibits “employers from making
employment-related decisions ‘on the basis of’ (as opposed to ‘because of’) an employee’s
disability.” Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12–cv–0817–RLY–
MJD, 2013 WL 121838, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013). Nayak found that this small revision
does not transform the ADA’s but-for causation requirement into a mixed-motive statute,
meaning the rule that an employer will only be liable for discrimination under the “regarded
as” prong where he would not have terminated the employee but for the employee’s
disability remains after the Amendments Act. Id. at *3-*4. Judging from this decision, the
alteration of the third prima facie element will likely have little or no effect on ADA
discrimination suits.
42. See Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (M.D.
Ala. 2012).
43. See, e.g., Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 331, 366-69 (2010); Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 667, 669-70 (2010).
44. Because the Amendments Act does not apply retroactively, only discriminatory
actions occurring after January 1, 2009, are scrutinized under the Amendment’s changes to
the ADA. See supra note 4.
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suits from January 1, 2012 through January 15, 2013 (the Amendments Act
study) and compared them to statistics gathered in a similar preAmendments Act study (the Berger study) for the years 2000 and 2001.45
Comparing these studies reveals that since the Amendments Act became
effective, federal courts have granted summary judgment to employers with
a noticeably declining frequency. More surprisingly, the Amendments Act
has also affected the bases for courts’ decisions in ways that might not have
been anticipated by most legal commentators.
A court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion—rather than the results
of a trial or motion to dismiss—represents the superior benchmark for
measuring the impact of the changes in the ADA. The Amendments Act has
not been in place long enough for an appreciable number of ADA
discrimination suits to proceed to trial.46 Thus, the time is not yet ripe to see
if the Amendments Act will enable employees to improve upon their
historically low win percentages in ADA discrimination trials.47 The Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal stage is also an inappropriate benchmark because courts
often grant dismissal for reasons unrelated to the merits of an employee’s
disability discrimination claim, especially when pro se plaintiffs are
involved.48
45. Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein, & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 45, 50-65 (2005).
46. Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination
Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 307 (2005)
(finding that, on average, ADA claims are resolved fourteen months after the plaintiff files a
claim).
47. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial
court level.”); see also Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title
I—Survey Update, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 339-40 (2010) (finding
that employers won in 97.4% of ADA discrimination suits in 2009, where the study counted
an employer “win” as either a victory after trial or the dismissal of an employee’s claim
before trial). But see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 445 tbl. 2
(2004) (showing that from 1998 to 2001 employees prevailed 41.27% of the time in ADA
jury trials).
48. Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 908 (1997) (“[M]any cases have
been poorly pleaded as it appears from many case histories that sufficient, undisputed
evidence was not offered to establish coverage.”). For an example of such a case, see Fierro
v. Knight Transp., No. EP–12–CV–00218–DCG, 2012 WL 4321304, at *2-*5 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 18, 2012).
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The grant or denial of summary judgment is a more appropriate indicator
of the turning of the tide in ADA discrimination lawsuits. Courts’
determinations at this stage more accurately depict the relative success of
the parties because ADA discrimination lawsuits rarely proceed to trial.49
Indeed, most employment discrimination lawsuits—perhaps as many as
70% of such lawsuits—are terminated by settlement.50 Consequently, the
major bargaining position lies at the summary judgment phase of
discrimination suits, when an employer moves for summary judgment.
From the employer’s perspective, she would rather spend her money
pursuing a summary judgment ruling than settling “in order to limit other
employees’ incentives to sue.”51 From the employee’s perspective, she may
be “blinded by serious emotional and financial distress,” causing her to be
overly optimistic about her likelihood of success until summary judgment is
denied.52 Even though a denial of summary judgment does not technically
terminate a case, once (and if) the court denies summary judgment, the
employer will “become serious” about settling, and thus as a practical
matter, the case will be terminated in the typical employment
discrimination suit.53
1. Plaintiffs Are More Likely to Survive Summary Judgment in the PostAmendments Act Era: Statistics
The newly discovered empirical data from the Amendments Act study
shows that plaintiffs have experienced greater success at the summary
judgment stage under the Amendments Act than they previously had under
the original ADA. In their 2000–2001 study, Berger, Finkelstein, and
Cheung analyzed the rate at which plaintiffs bringing various
discrimination claims were able to survive their employers’ motions for
summary judgment in the federal district courts of the Second Circuit.54
49. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271,
276-77 (2000).
50. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 47, at 440.
51. Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 740 (2004).
52. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 45, at 46, 48.
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id. at 50-52. Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung compiled their data using two
methods: by conducting a Westlaw search using key terms associated with employment
discrimination suits and by compiling a list of all filings coded under the heading (“Civil
rights: jobs”) from the PACER online database. Id. at 51-53. The Berger study only includes
cases from the Second Circuit, whereas the Amendments Act study contains cases from all
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Cases involving pro se plaintiffs were excluded from the statistics, owing to
the substantial distorting effect pro se cases had on the sample.55
Additionally, data collected from Westlaw was adjusted for “publication
bias,” which refers to the tendency of courts to issue a higher number of
written opinions for decisions granting summary judgment than those
denying summary judgment.56 With respect to disability claims brought
under the ADA, the Berger study found that employees survived summary
judgment only 24.3% of the time (or in nine out of thirty-seven cases) in all
of the district courts of the Second Circuit combined.57 In fact, ADA
plaintiffs had the lowest summary judgment survival rate compared to all
other employment discrimination plaintiffs analyzed in the Berger study.58
Notably, the summary judgment denial percentage would have been even
lower if the sample of district courts did not include New York.59 Because
New York’s state disability laws defined “disability” more broadly than the
original ADA, a discernible number of suits survived summary judgment
merely because plaintiffs’ pendent state claims defeated summary
federal jurisdictions. Because the data for the Berger study and Amendments Act study come
from different courts, the comparison of the two surveys is admittedly somewhat of an
“apples and oranges” comparison. However, because the Amendments Act study contains
opinions from a wide array of courts—thereby diminishing the influence of the occasional
“pro-employer” or “pro-employee” jurisdiction—I believe any distorting effect from using
cases outside of the Second Circuit in the Amendments Act study is minimal. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Second Circuit has been described as having both
“pro-employee” and “pro-employer” tendencies by different commentators. See Richard L.
Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 301, 343 (1986) (pro-employee); Brandy S. Parrish, Note, Walking an Evidentiary
Tightrope: the Aftermath of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 31 U. MEM. L.
REV. 677, 707 (2001) (pro-employer).
55. Id. at 56, 57 tbl. 3.
56. Id. at 52; see also Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg
from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1146 (1990) (“[I]t is almost certainly the case that
rulings that dispose of a case are more likely to be written and more likely to be
published.”). Because the data collected for this Comment was also gathered from an online
database (WestlawNext), and in order to maintain an accurate comparison, only the results
obtained by the Berger study before this “adjustment” will be used for comparison to the
Amendments Act results shown in Table 1, infra.
57. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 45, at 59, 60 tbl. 5. Even after the
adjustment for publication bias, the study revealed that employees survived summary
judgment in only 32.1% of the relevant ADA cases. Id.
58. Id. at 60 tbl. 5 (compiling data for race, sex, and age discrimination claims, as well
as retaliation claims).
59. Id. at 62-63.
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judgment, even though their federal ADA claims did not survive.60 Also, an
even lower percentage of summary judgment denials likely existed for the
near decade following the study,61 owing to the fact that the Berger study
preceded the Supreme Court’s major disability-narrowing opinions: Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,62 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams.63
In order to achieve a parallel comparison to the Berger study, to the
fullest extent possible I used the same methodology utilized in the Berger
study to collect summary judgment statistics in the Amendments Act
study.64 The results of the Amendments Act study are depicted in Table 1
below, revealing that employees survived their employers’ summary
judgment motions at a rate of 39.2%,65 representing an increase of 14.9%
from the summary judgment survival rate plaintiffs achieved under the
ADA in 2000–2001.66
60. Id.; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 1998).
The data coding process employed by Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung regarded plaintiffs as
surviving summary judgment so long as one of their claims survived the summary judgment
phase, even if summary judgment was granted to the employer on the federal ADA claim.
See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 51.
61. See Allbright, supra note 47, at 342 tbl. 4 (showing the years 2003-2009 had some
of the lowest ADA plaintiff win percentages in the history of the ADA). But see Jones, supra
note 43, at 692 (noting that ADA plaintiffs actually fared better when appealing to the circuit
courts in the early wake of Toyota and Sutton than they had previously).
62. 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
63. 534 U.S. 184, 200-02 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of
2008, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
64. To this end, I used a broad key-term search in WestlawNext to yield as many Title I
discrimination and failure to accommodate cases as possible. Collecting cases from January
1, 2012, through January 15, 2013, I searched all federal district and circuit courts, using the
search phrase “(ADAAA & disability & discrimination).” Then, I individually analyzed each
opinion to ensure that the Amendments Act (not the original ADA) applied to the lawsuit.
All opinions other than summary judgment dispositions were screened from the sample.
And, like in the Berger study, all pro se cases were excluded from the sample. Summary
judgment was only considered denied where at least one of the plaintiff’s federal
Amendments Act claims (either alleging discriminatory conduct or a failure to
accommodate) survived summary judgment; the disposition of any pendent state claims was
disregarded.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 60 tbl. 5. Even assuming that
the WestlawNext search conducted for this Comment contained no publication bias, there
would still be an increase in the rate in which employees survive summary judgment under
the ADA. That is, if every written opinion in every federal court was available on
WestlawNext and found through this author’s search (an inconceivable proposition, given
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Table 1: Summary Judgment Statistics for Employers’ Motions for
Summary Judgment in Amendments Act Cases, Jan. 1, 2012–Jan. 15, 2013,
All Federal Courts
Summary Judgment Granted
31/51 (60.8%)67

Summary Judgment Denied
20/51 (39.2%)68

the fact that not all opinions are published on Westlaw), the rate of summary judgment
denial would still be 7.1% higher for Amendments Act cases (39.2%) than for the adjusted
summary judgment survival rate under the Berger study (32.1%). See id.
67. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2012); Wurzel v.
Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 2 (6th Cir. 2012); Wirey v. Richland Cmty. Coll., 913 F.
Supp. 2d 633, 635 (C.D. Ill. 2012); Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 11–487 (MJD/JJG),
2012 WL 6552795, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012); Johnson v. City of Murray, 909 F. Supp.
2d 1265, 1273 (D. Utah 2012); Angell v. Fairmount Fire Prot. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1242,
1255 (D. Colo. 2012); Walker v. Venetian Casino Resort, LLC, No. 02:10–CV–00195–
LRH–VCF, 2012 WL 4794149, at *16 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2012); Fossesigurani v. City of
Bridgeport Fire Dep’t, No. 3:11–cv–752 (VLB), 2012 WL 4512772, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 1,
2012); Torres v. Bremen Castings, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–035, 2012 WL 4498876, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. Sept. 28, 2012); Karr v. Napolitano, No. C 11–02207 LB, 2012 WL 4462919, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012); Love v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.–N. Miss., Inc., No. 2:10CV176–
SA–JMV, 2012 WL 4465569, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012); Mota v. Aaron’s Sales &
Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL 3815332, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012); Howze
v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm., for Econ. Opportunity, No. 2:11–CV–52–VEH, 2012 WL
3775871, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2012); Howard v. Steris Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1283 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Poper v. SCA Ams., Inc., No. 10–3201, 2012 WL 3288111, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2012); Beatty v. Hudco Indus. Prods., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1356
(N.D. Ala. 2012); Jenkins v. Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966 (N.D.
Iowa 2012); Lohf v. Great Plains Mfg., Inc., No. 10–1177–RDR, 2012 WL 2568170, at *9
(D. Kan. July 2, 2012); Bar-Meir v. Univ. of Minn., No. 10–936 (SRN/JJK), 2012 WL
2402849, at *6 (D. Minn. June 26, 2012); Robinson v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No.
10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012); Ratcliff v.
Mountain Brook Bd. of Educ., No. 2:11–CV–0029–KOB, 2012 WL 1884898, at *1 (N.D.
Ala. May 22, 2012); Diaz v. City of Phila., No. 11–671, 2012 WL 1657866, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
May 10, 2012); Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257
(M.D. Ala. 2012); Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012
WL 1439060, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012); Sechler v. Modular Space Corp., No. 4:10–
CV–5177, 2012 WL 1355586, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2012); Ryan v. Columbus Reg’l
Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 7:10–CV–234–BR, 2012 WL 1230234, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12,
2012); McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL
1227154, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012); De La Cruz v. Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade
Cnty., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Sickels v. Cent. Nine Career Ctr., No.
1:10–cv–00479–SEB–DKL, 2012 WL 266945, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012); Holland v.
Shinseki, No. 3:10–CV–0908–B, 2012 WL 162333, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2012); Azzam
v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
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Had the Berger study excluded all pendent state claims (as the
Amendments Act study did), the results would show an even greater
percentage increase than 14.9% in summary judgment denial.69 Regardless,
any progress for disabled employees who have suffered employment
discrimination marks a significant advancement for plaintiffs’ rights,
especially given the prohibitively low plaintiff success rates revealed by the
Berger study.70
The fact that plaintiffs filing suit under the ADA can survive summary
judgment motions at a higher rate after the Amendments Act should not
come as a shock to those familiar with the Amendment. In fact, one legal
scholar accurately predicted that “[t]he primary effect of the [Amendments
Act] will be to remove existence of disability as a robust summary
judgment issue for employers.”71 A necessary consequence of this effect is
an increase in plaintiffs’ bargaining power during settlement negotiations,72
which increases costs to employers. Regardless of increasing costs, the
Amendments Act should be lauded for lowering the obstacle of summary
68. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484, 2014 WL 1584674, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr.
22, 2014), rev’g 2012 WL 3945540 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2012); Mercer v. Arbor E & T,
LLC, No. 11–cv–3600, 2013 WL 164107, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2013); Howard v. Pa.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 11–1938, 2013 WL 102662, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2013);
Shelton v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:11–cv–381, 2012 WL 5385601, at *24 (S.D. Ohio Nov.
1, 2012); Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1382 (N.D. Ga.
2012); Harty v. City of Sanford, No. 6:11–cv–1041–Orl–31KRS, 2012 WL 3243282, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012); Socoloski v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 11–3508, 2012 WL
3155523, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2012); Holmes v. Cutchall Mgmt. Kan. LLC, No. 10–
2672–EFM, 2012 WL 3071056, at *1 (D. Kan. July 26, 2012); Dentice v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., No. 10–C–113, 2012 WL 2504046, at *21 (E.D. Wis. June 28, 2012); Schrack v. R+L
Carriers, Inc., No. 1:10cv603, 2012 WL 2309365, at *14 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2012); Pearce–
Mato v. Shinseki, No. 2:10–cv–1029, 2012 WL 2116533, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012);
Wright v. Stark Truss Co., No. 2:10–2427–RMG–BM, 2012 WL 3029638, at *14 (D.S.C.
May 10, 2012); Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863, at *17 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 27, 2012); McNamee v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 2:10–CV–01294–
GMN–PAL, 2012 WL 1142710, at *6 (D. Nev. Apr. 4, 2012); Mills v. Temple Univ., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 609, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10–05562, 2012 WL
1033472, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2012); Barlow v. Walgreen Co., No. 8:11–cv–71–T–
30EAJ, 2012 WL 868807, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012); Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10–861,
2012 WL 604169, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012); Wells v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 860 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (S.D. Ohio 2012); Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc., 840 F.
Supp. 2d 984, 1007-08 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
69. See Berger, Finkelstein, & Cheung, supra note 45, at 62-63.
70. Id. at 59, 60 tbl. 5.
71. Jones, supra note 43, at 693.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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judgment for individuals who have impairments substantially limiting a
major life activity but would previously have been unable to bring a
successful claim under the ADA.
The pendulum seems to have swung back too far, however, because
many courts assume a disability exists when faced with somewhat close
calls under the Amendments Act.73 This skips a vital step in the analysis—
the threshold requirement for the application of the ADA.74 Moreover, upon
analyzing the bases on which courts are granting summary judgment under
the Amendments Act, it seems that the plaintiff’s qualified individual
burden under the ADA has overcompensated for the more lenient standard
of proving an ADA disability.
2. The Amplified Role of the Qualified Individual Determination
Whereas a plaintiff’s lack of disability served as the primary basis for
granting summary judgment under the ADA,75 the Amendments Act study
reveals that federal courts granted summary judgment based at least in part
on the determination that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual in
32.3% (10/31) of the opinions granting summary judgment.76 Furthermore,
if the pro se cases would not have been excluded from the study, the
qualified individual analysis would have been a major factor in granting
summary judgment for an astounding 38.2% (13/34) of the cases where

73. See infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014) (“The determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.”);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating that no employer “shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability”) (emphasis added)).
75. See Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Titles I and V—
Survey Update, 35 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394, 396 (2011).
76. See Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir. 2012); Wurzel v.
Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 11 (6th Cir. 2012); Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 11–
487 (MJD/JJG), 2012 WL 6552795, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2012); Walker v. Venetian
Casino Resort, LLC, No. 02:10–CV–00195–LRH–VCF, 2012 WL 4794149, at *15 (D. Nev.
Oct. 9, 2012); Torres v. Bremen Castings, Inc., No. 3:11–CV–035, 2012 WL 4498876, at
*11-*12 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012); Diaz v. City of Phila., No. 11–671, 2012 WL 1657866,
at *9, *14 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2012); Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, Ala., 857 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1264, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2012); McDaniel v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
22, No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154, at *4, *6 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012); De La
Cruz v. Children’s Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280-81 (S.D. Fla.
2012); Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662 (W.D. Ky.
2012).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

126

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:111

summary judgment was granted to the employer.77 Even in many of the
opinions denying summary judgment to employers, the qualified individual
determination lay at the heart of the courts’ decisions.78 This proves that the
qualified individual determination has become the major battleground in
disability discrimination suits.
In fact, Mashek v. Soo Line R.R. Co. shows that at least one court
applying the Amendments Act has focused its entire analysis on the
qualified individual decision, completely ignoring the other two prima facie
elements.79 In Mashek, the district court in Minnesota stated that because
the employee could not establish he was a qualified individual for his
position, the court “need not address” the other prima facie elements.80 This
type of cursory review seems to be more consistent with courts’ treatment
of the disability determination pre-Amendments Act.81 As a consequence,
employees bringing disability claims, especially pro se plaintiffs, may be
particularly vulnerable to summary judgment motions alleging the
employee is not a qualified individual under the ADA.
3. Courts Are Still Granting Summary Judgment Because No Disability
Exists
Employees with some type of impairment do not automatically satisfy
the disability prima facie element just because the definition of a disabled
person has been expanded under the Amendments Act.82 In fact, some
plaintiffs have failed to prove a disability even under the more lenient
77. See Ivey v. First Quality Retail Serv., 490 F. App’x 281, 286 (11th Cir. 2012);
Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., P.C., No. 3:10–CV–0882, 2012 WL 1801740, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012); Hardin v. Christus Health Se. Tex. St. Elizabeth, No. 1:10–CV–
596, 2012 WL 760642, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012).
78. See, e.g., Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1377-79
(N.D. Ga. 2012); Barlow v. Walgreen Co., No. 8:11–cv–71–T–30EAJ, 2012 WL 868807, at
*5-*6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012).
79. 2012 WL 6552795, at *6-*7.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Although the court in Mashek may have ignored the other two prima facie elements
in order to conserve judicial resources, this type of analysis would have been unfathomable
prior to the adoption of the Amendments Act. Before the Amendment, courts were much
more likely to grant summary judgment based on the employee’s lack of a disability,
ignoring the other prima facie elements. See Allbright, supra note 75, at 396.
82. See, e.g., Poper v. SCA Ams., Inc., No. 10–3201, 2012 WL 3288111, at *7-*9 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 13, 2012) (finding temporary back pain was not a disability under the Amendments
Act); Ratcliff v. Mountain Brook Bd. of Educ., No. 2:11–CV–0029–KOB, 2012 WL
1884898, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 2012) (finding high blood pressure and occasional “ill
and woozy feelings” did not make the plaintiff disabled under the Amendments Act).
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Amendments Act standards. The Amendments Act study shows that 22.6%
(7/31) of the time, courts relied solely on the employee’s lack of an ADA
disability in granting summary judgment to the employer.83 While over
20% represents a substantial percentage, this figure signifies a major
decline from pre-Amendments Act case law, when a large majority of ADA
claims brought were terminated at the summary judgment stage due to
plaintiffs’ failure to establish a disability.84 Because the Supreme Court
prohibitively construed the definition of a disability pre-Amendments Act,
many deserving employees were effectively prevented from bringing their
disability claims.85 In the legislative history of the Amendments Act, the
House Committee on Education and Labor explained the abuse of the
summary judgment device concerning the plaintiff’s failure to establish he
was disabled under the original ADA:
Too often cases have turned solely on the question of whether
the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; too rarely have
courts considered the merits of the discrimination claim, such as
whether adverse decisions were impermissibly made by the
employer on the basis of disability, reasonable accommodations
were denied inappropriately, or qualification standards were
unlawfully discriminatory.86
Perhaps the frequency of cases turning solely on the question of whether
the plaintiff is disabled has been reduced to an appropriate level under the
Amendments Act. On the other hand, having a “disability” under the new
ADA may have lost all of its common sense meaning.87 Regardless, the
Amendments Act study shows that although courts have granted summary
judgment to employers less often based on the employee’s lack of a
disability, courts are still finding a lack of a disability in some cases.

83. See Johnson v. City of Murray, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1295 (D. Utah 2012); Love v.
Baptist Mem’l Hosp.–N. Miss., Inc., No. 2:10CV176–SA–JMV, 2012 WL 4465569, at *4
(N.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2012); Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012
WL 3815332, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012); Poper, 2012 WL 3288111, at *9; Jenkins v.
Med. Labs. of E. Iowa, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 946, 960 (N.D. Iowa 2012); Robinson v.
Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012); Ratcliff, 2012 WL 1884898, at *3.
84. See Allbright, supra note 75, at 396.
85. See infra text accompanying note 196.
86. H.R. REP. NO. 110–730(I), at 8 (2008).
87. See Carol J. Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad Interpretation of ADAAA Disability
Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limits” Mean?, 76 MO. L. REV. 43, 61 (2011).
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B. The Practical Effects of Focusing on Job Qualifications Rather than
Whether an Individual Is Disabled
In summary dispositions under the Amendments Act, the role of the
qualified individual determination seems to have evolved naturally. The
primary purpose of the Amendments Act was to make it easier for
employees to show they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA;
so intuitively, the disability determination will no longer serve as such a
strong weapon for employers. The third prima facie element, requiring a
plaintiff to show that she was discriminated against “on the basis” of her
disability,88 is also not a source employers can consistently rely upon for
achieving victory at the summary judgment stage. Because the causation
requirement is a highly factual determination, often based on conflicting
testimonies, this element is rarely an appropriate one for summary
judgment.89
As a result, the qualified individual determination is the most viable
basis for employers to win at the summary judgment stage under the
Amendments Act. Employers and human resource departments seem to be
slightly ahead of the curve compared to legal commentators in recognizing
this fact. One human resources article has advised its readers, “[Y]our main
defense will be that despite reasonable accommodations, a disabled
employee still couldn’t perform the essential job functions.”90 Furthermore,
that article provided the following advice concerning what employers
should do to protect themselves from potential ADA lawsuits: “First,
update your job descriptions. Determine ahead of time which job functions
are essential—as opposed to marginal. If you have job descriptions, dust
them off and review them closely to make sure they accurately set forth the
position’s essential functions.”91 This advice happens to be quite consistent
with current EEOC regulations, which state that essential functions are the
“fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires . . . [and do] not include the marginal functions of
the position.”92

88. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
89. See Fleck v. Wilmac Corp., No. 10–05562, 2012 WL 1033472, at *11-*12 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 2012).
90. Jonathan R. Mook, Five Steps to Protect Your Company from Claims Under New
ADA, HR HERO LINE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.hrhero.com/hl/articles/2010/09/09/fivesteps-to-protect-your-company-from-claims-under-new-ada/.
91. Id.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2014).
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To guide the qualified individual analysis, EEOC regulations list several
concrete factors courts may consider in determining whether a function is
essential to the job, including
[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job; [t]he amount of time spent
on the job performing the function; [t]he consequences of not
requiring the incumbent to perform the function; [t]he terms of a
collective bargaining agreement; [t]he work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or [t]he current work experience of
incumbents in similar jobs.93
Following the EEOC’s mandates, employers will now have to determine
which functions are truly essential, rather than marginal, for each position
within their companies. But, because of the guidance provided by the
EEOC, this will not be a blind undertaking. Another benefit of the guidance
provided by the EEOC regulations will be the predictability and consistency
it may create among the federal courts. Because courts have to apply the
same limited number of factors to each case, a clear spectrum of what does
and does not constitute an essential function will likely emerge. Thus, the
shift in focus to the qualified individual analysis will likely bring many
advantages. But it may include negative consequences as well.
C. Has Congress Created a Perverse Incentive for Employers?
Although yet unrealized, the Amendments Act might have the
unintended effect of creating an incentive for employers to inflate job
descriptions to bar disabled individuals from positions. Because many
employers know that any impaired individuals they hire will have a
stronger chance of successfully suing under the Amendments Act, they
might distort the physical and mental demands of a job such that individuals
with impairments cannot meet the threshold. In doing so, such employers
could purport to be justified for refusing to hire an individual with a
potential disability under the Amendments Act, so long as that individual
fails to meet one of the heightened requirements for the position.94

93. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating that only qualified individuals are
protected under the Amendments Act).
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In theory, if discriminatory intent motivates employers to raise their job
qualifications, they would be liable for employment discrimination.95 In
reality, though, even if employers intentionally screen out qualified job
applicants with disabilities, it is unlikely that disabled employees rejected in
the application process will bring ADA claims for discrimination in the
hiring process.96 Victims of hiring discrimination may refuse to bring
discrimination suits for a litany of reasons. They may not know of their
rights under the ADA.97 Even if they are aware of those protections, they
“may find the remedy insufficient, the prospect of success slight, the advent
of success long-delayed, or the enforcement procedures complex and
intimidating.”98 Moreover, with the looming need to find employment,
these victims may “simply wish to forget [their] pain and get on with [their
lives].”99 In contrast, most current employees have invested their own
human capital into skills specific to a position and are, therefore, more
prone to sue when they believe they have been discriminated against.100 For
these reasons, the number of claims brought against employers for failure to
hire is largely overshadowed by the number of claims brought by current or
former employees.101
Therefore, when faced with the costs of lawsuits for hiring
discrimination (which have proven slight) and the potential costs for future

95. Id. (stating employers will be liable for discrimination with regard to job application
procedures, among other things).
96. See Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 219, 253 (1995).
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 254; see also George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology,
Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 43, 75-76 (1993) (“[F]ew plaintiffs would go to the trouble and expense of
bringing a claim for discrimination if they could easily seek an equally attractive job with
another employer.”).
100. Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 75-76.
101. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1024 (1991) (noting the greater probability
of a plaintiff bringing a wrongful termination claim than a failure to hire claim); Munroe,
supra note 96, at 254; Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 75 & n.113 (citing a study finding that,
out of sixty-four cases in which a plaintiff brought an employment discrimination claim,
only one of those cases was brought by a plaintiff who applied for a job and was rejected);
William G. Somerville III, Avoiding Lawsuits for Employment Discrimination, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 277, 279 (1997) (“Most employment discrimination suits are brought by
current and former employees, not by rejected applicants.”).
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discrimination suits (which could be great),102 it seems likely that
employers will typically choose to bear the costs of the former. In this
light, Congress may have won the battle in passing the Amendments Act,
but there is a chance it will lose the war. Any hindrance to achieving
“equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for [disabled] individuals” would be a major
shortcoming in fulfilling the goals of the Amendments Act.103 Accordingly,
drafters of further revisions of the ADA and EEOC regulations should bear
in mind, and seek to avoid, this possibility.
IV. A Call to Align: Harmonizing the Disability Determination Under the
Amendments Act with the ADA’s Original Goals
In addition to the increased importance of the qualified individual
analysis, the major changes concerning who qualifies as disabled under the
Amendments Act have had a drastic impact on cases applying the Act.104
The broad principles of the Amendments Act have protected, and will
continue to protect, an increasing number of individuals from
discrimination based on their disabilities.105 However, the broad purposes of
the Amendments Act fundamentally clash with Congress’s retention of the
key requirement that impairments must substantially limit major life
activities in order for an individual to be classified as disabled.106 The
tension between these two conflicting standards has led to inconsistency
and unpredictability in the courts.107 Adding to the confusion, courts must
102. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 101, at 1024 n.131 (citing Richard A.
Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 519 (1987)) (“Since
firing costs are incurred in the future, whereas the costs of failure to hire are borne
immediately, the former must be discounted in computing the net effect of discrimination
laws.”) Depending on the likelihood that a job candidate will be terminated, there may be a
“small (net) disincentive to hire [disabled people].” See id. at 1024.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).
104. See supra Part III.A.1.
105. See, e.g., Socoloski v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 11–3508, 2012 WL 3155523, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2012) (denying summary judgment where evidence showed that an
employee of thirty-eight years was fired due to physiological conditions that most likely
would not have been covered under the original ADA).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
107. Compare Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012
WL 1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012) (conducting its own analysis of “substantially
limiting,” rather than giving deference to the Amendments Act’s instruction that the
definition of a disability is to be determined according to the broad purposes of the
Amendments Act), with Gesegnet v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., No. 3:09–CV–828–H, 2011
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sift through numerous and sometimes conflicting statutes, regulations, and
guidelines when applying the Amendments Act.108 Moreover, there is a lack
of case law interpreting the Amendments Act and an abundance of case law
interpreting the ADA.109 When faced with the choice of applying broad, yet
vague principles or following concrete direction from pre-Amendments Act
case law, some courts have chosen the latter, despite the Act’s primary goal
of broadening the definition of disabled.110 But are these courts to blame, or
is the real culprit a lack of guidance?
Not only have federal courts applying the Amendments Act come to
different conclusions when faced with similar choices, but some courts
have simply failed to follow the explicit directions found in regulations111
or have applied rationales specifically rejected by the Amendments Act.112
The most likely explanation for these erroneous decisions is the difficulty in
navigating the scattered layout of the Amendments Act’s many regulations
and statutes. These decisions could also be a product of the conflicting
WL 2119248, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2011) (assuming the plaintiff had a disability even
though the court “doubt[ed] that the medical and personal evidence . . . [was] sufficient to
show an actual inability to perform a basic function of life”).
108. An additional complication is the fact that the statutes and regulations became
effective on different dates. While courts generally agree that the Amendments Act is not
retroactive, a smaller number of courts have taken the time to consider whether the EEOC
regulations apply retroactively. See, e.g., Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App’x 827, 835
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the regulations are not to have retroactive effect); Azzam v.
Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (citing EEOC
v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 641 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010)) (same).
109. A search for the term “ADA” returned over 10,000 case results in WestlawNext’s
online database, but a search for “ADAAA” returned only 560 cases.
110. See, e.g., Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010) (finding employee had no disability based on his Prinzmetal
angina by relying on Toyota’s instruction that “an impairment that only moderately or
intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial
limitation under the ADA”), aff’d, 482 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2012).
111. See, e.g., EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. La.
2011) (referring incorrectly to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (2011) as stating that an individual
proceeding under a failure to accommodate claim does not have to prove she has an actual
disability or record of such a disability, even though the relevant regulations clearly stated
otherwise).
112. See Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., P.C., No. 3:10–CV–0882, 2012 WL 1801740,
at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (applying rationale from Toyota that, to be disabled, an
impairment must significantly restrict an individual “from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives”). This reasoning was specifically rejected by the
Amendments Act. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(4), 122
Stat. 3553, 3554.
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standards currently existing within the statutes and regulations. To align the
Amendments Act with the original goals of the ADA and provide consistent
guidance for federal courts applying the Amendments Act, this Part offers a
few suggestions for Congress and the EEOC regarding the disability
determination under the current statutes and regulations.
A. The Ever Ambiguous Standard: The EEOC Should Provide Affirmative
Guidance for Interpreting “Substantially Limits”
The majority of the EEOC’s rules of construction for interpreting when
impairments substantially limit a major life activity are devoted to
explaining how not to make that determination.113 EEOC regulations only
provide affirmative guidance for making this determination in two sections
of the regulations.114 The EEOC first provides a list of impairments that will
“in virtually all cases” substantially limit a major life activity.115 For
example, it clarifies that deafness and blindness will always constitute
disabilities.116 Second, the regulations allow for the consideration of the
condition, manner, or duration in which the individual performs the major
life activity.117 But even though the EEOC allows courts to consider such
factors while conducting their substantial limitation analysis, these tools of
construction are not very helpful. For one thing, the Interpretive Guidance
offers only a few examples of how to consider these three factors.118
Additionally, the EEOC has made clear that these three factors are only
discretionary tools for courts119 and, therefore, “may often be unnecessary

113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)-(2), (5) (2014).
114. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii), (4)(i).
115. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)-(iii).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 1630.2(j)(4)(i). This may consist of analyzing “the difficulty, effort, or time
required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life
activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; and/or the way an
impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(4)(ii).
118. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(4) (2014).
119. See id. (stating that these factors may be considered when appropriate). This
Comment does not suggest that the condition, manner, and duration factors should be used
as part of a rigid test. Rather, even when considered, these factors do not provide sufficient
affirmative guidance for courts to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

134

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:111

to conduct the analysis of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a
major life activity.”120
Another regulation appears to offer affirmative guidance at first glance,
but a closer look at the Interpretive Guidance reveals the contrary. This
regulation states that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning
of . . . [the ADA] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to
perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general
population.”121 Under the original ADA, an individual was considered
substantially limited with regard to a major life activity when she was
“[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform.”122 The EEOC clarified that the change
from the “average person” standard to the “most people” standard “is not a
substantive change in the concept, but rather is intended to conform the
language to the simpler and more straightforward terminology used in the
legislative history to the Amendments Act.”123 Because this change was not
meant to substantively change the “substantially limits” analysis, it provides
no affirmative guidance to courts concerning how the new definition of a
disability differs from the old one under the original ADA.
The only other “guidance” given to courts is the implicit understanding
that “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to
require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for
‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.”124 In a similar vein,
EEOC regulations clarify what is not required for a plaintiff to prove a
substantially limiting impairment. Specifically, the relevant regulation
states that an impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely
restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be
considered substantially limiting.”125 But exactly what degree of functional
limitation is required? Before much case law surfaced interpreting the
Amendments Act, one professor realized the tension in the conflicting
ideals embodied in the rules of construction and the Amendments Act’s
stated purposes.126 Professor Carol Miller, writing on the subject in 2011,
120. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,984 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified as
amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (emphasis added).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2014).
122. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (1992).
123. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) (2012).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2012).
125. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
126. See Miller, supra note 87, at 61.
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accurately predicted that courts would see that despite the broad
congressional purposes of the Amendments Act, the definition of a
disability under the EEOC is “counterintuitive to the common sense
meaning of ‘substantially limits.’”127 In other words, “[h]ow can an
impairment ‘substantially limit’ a major life activity and simultaneously
‘not significantly or severely restrict’ the same activity?”128
In addition to Professor Miller, one district court recognized the
seemingly odd construction that courts are forced to place on the word
“substantially.”129 In Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, the employee
suffered from a hearing impairment that diminished his ability to fully
recognize the words of others.130 Even with this impairment, however, the
employee could still “achieve 96% in speech recognition.”131 In ruling that
the “actual disability” prong had not been satisfied under the Amendments
Act, the court stated that if such a minimal amount of hearing impairment
could qualify an individual as disabled, it would render the ADA’s
“‘substantial’ limitation” language meaningless because “any hearing
impairment could constitute a disability.”132 The court found this level of
impairment insufficient to label the plaintiff as disabled and, accordingly,
granted summary judgment to the employer.133
Similarly, in Robinson v. Roosevelt Union Free School District, the
employee failed to prove that her leg, back, and hip disabilities inhibited her
in a substantial way.134 More specifically, even though the plaintiff claimed
she was “limited in her ability to . . . walk up stairs, stand for long periods
of time, lift heavy objects, bend over, or engage in any physical activity,”
she was unable to put forth evidence establishing the degree of her
impairments.135 The court conceded that she had established that her major
life activities were impaired, but her vague claims failed to prove that her
impairment substantially limited any legitimate major life activity.136 Citing
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09–CV–01071–KJD–VCF, 2012 WL
1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012); see also Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App’x
827, 832-33 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff had to “make more than a conclusory
showing that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for herself”).
130. Curley, 2012 WL 1439060, at *3.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. No. 10–CV–834 (SJF)(ETB), 2012 WL 1980410, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012).
135. Id. at *7.
136. Id.
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a Second Circuit three-part test, which requires a plaintiff to prove “(1) that
she suffers from a physical or mental impairment, which (2) limits a ‘major
life activity,’ (3) ‘substantially,’” the court granted summary judgment to
the employer.137 Although this test simply reiterates the statutory definition,
it correctly forces courts to separately consider the degree of limitation an
impairment places on a major life activity—not just whether the impairment
limits such an activity at all.
Just as Professor Miller predicted, courts have had difficulty reconciling
the broad purposes of the Amendments Act with the materiality
requirement imposed by the term “substantially” limiting.138 More courts
can be expected to reach outcomes similar to those in Curley and Robinson
because the lack of direction remains when these two competing interests
collide with one another. Courts will inevitably take one of two approaches
when faced with a “close call” of whether the plaintiff suffers from an
actual disability under the Amendments Act. Like in Curley, courts could
adopt their own understanding of what level of impairment rises to a
“substantial” limitation, thereby conducting their own weighing analysis.139
Otherwise, they will probably follow the purpose of the Amendments Act
and assume that a disability exists without extensive analysis140 because the
definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals.”141
To avoid this problem, Professor Miller suggests, as one approach, that
Congress could eliminate the “substantial” limitation wording and create a
more fitting, intermediate standard for implementing the Amendments
Act.142 This approach makes sense due to the fact that the phrase

137. Id. (citing a pre-Amendments Act test from Weixel v. Board of Education of City of
New York, 287 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002), and refusing to rely upon any postAmendments Act cases in making the disability determination).
138. See Miller, supra note 87, at 61.
139. See Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, No. 2:09-CV-01071-KJD-VCF, 2012 WL
1439060, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2012) (holding that 3% whole body hearing impairment
does not pass the substantial limitation threshold).
140. See, e.g., Gesegnet v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., No. 3:09–CV–828–H, 2011 WL
2119248, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2011) (assuming the plaintiff had a disability even
though the court “doubt[ed] that the medical and personal evidence . . . [was] sufficient to
show an actual inability to perform a basic function of life.”); see also Jana K. Terry, The
ADA Amendments Act Three Years After Passage: The EEOC’s Final Regulations and the
First Court Decisions Emerge at Last, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 49, 53-54 (listing
cases where courts assume a disability but express their doubts).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
142. Miller, supra note 87, at 78-79.
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“substantially limits” no longer holds its “common sense meaning.”143
Changing the language would also obviate the difficult task of courts
having to place an individual’s impairment somewhere between two
completely opposite poles. This approach, however, fails to recognize that
with each major overhaul of the ADA, the possibility for confusion
exponentially increases. The Amendments Act case law makes abundantly
clear that courts have struggled to reconcile a historic piece of legislation
(the ADA) with its even more ambitious amendment.144 Hurling another
major change at federal courts would only exacerbate the problem. Even
Congress recognized this fact. After extensively considering whether to
adopt a new standard of functional limitation under the Amendments Act, it
ultimately concluded that “adopting a new, undefined term that is subject to
widely disparate meanings is not the best way to achieve the goal of
ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under [the] Act.”145
Consequently, the EEOC may be obliged to maintain the “substantial”
limitation wording, even if it is forced to graft onto it a new meaning. To
create consistent results in the federal courts, though, more positive
guidance must be given by the EEOC. This approach, which Professor
Miller also suggested in some form, represents the most workable
compromise given the circumstances.146 Fortunately, affirmative guidance
for such an approach already exists in a statement issued by Representatives
Steny Hoyer and Jim Sensenbrenner during the legislative history of the
Amendments Act. Their approach, which the EEOC should adopt, specifies
that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity when it
“materially restricts” a major life activity.147 They explained the proper
analysis of when an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity
as follows:
“Substantially limits” has been defined as “materially restricts”
in order to communicate to the courts that we believe that their
interpretation of “significantly limits” was stricter than we had
intended. On the severity spectrum, “materially restricts” is
meant to be less than “severely restricts,” and less than

143. See id. at 61.
144. See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
145. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2014).
146. Miller, supra note 87, at 78.
147. 154 CONG. REC. 13,766 (2008) (joint statement of Reps. Hoyer & Sensenbrunner).
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“significantly restricts,” but more serious than a moderate
impairment which would be in the middle of the spectrum.148
Even though this analysis was not incorporated into the final codified form
of the Amendments Act, it proves that the EEOC has means to provide
affirmative guidance for the disability determination, while maintaining the
original “substantial” limitation language that Congress seems resolved to
keep. However the EEOC chooses to amend the regulations, recent case
law makes abundantly clear that merely explaining what a disability is not
will only lead to continued misunderstandings.
B. Overly Broad “Regarded As” Coverage: “Regarded As” Individuals
Should Have to Prove More Than Just an Impairment
As in the substantial limitation analysis, the degree of (perceived)
limitation caused by an impairment should be a relevant factor in
determining whether a disability exists under the “regarded as” prong.
Under the Amendments Act, however, the individual alleging that he has
been regarded as disabled need only prove that an employer discriminated
against him “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.” 149 This is true unless the impairment is both transitory
and minor.150 Under this rule, almost any individual with some appreciable
impairment (or perceived impairment) may qualify as being “regarded as”
disabled.151 More specifically, an actual or perceived impairment does not
have to limit a major life activity in any way whatsoever if the
“impairment” lasts or is expected to last longer than six months.152
Snyder v. Livingston illustrates just how far coverage under the “regarded
as” prong has extended under the Amendments Act.153 As a rare example of
absolute adherence to the Amendments Act, the Snyder court refused to
consider any pre-Amendments Act case law construing when an individual
qualifies as disabled under the “regarded as” prong.154 For this reason,
148. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 110–730(I), at 9-10 (2008) (“In the range of severity of
the limitation, ‘materially restricted’ is meant to be less than a severe or significant
limitation and more than a moderate limitation, as opposed to a minor limitation.”).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
150. Id. § 12102(3)(B).
151. See, e.g., Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863, at *6 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 27, 2012).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
153. See Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *6-*8.
154. Id. at *7.
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Snyder represents the unfiltered analysis mandated by the current regulatory
scheme.155 The court began its analysis by reciting the Amendments Act’s
broad purposes of construing the definition of disability “broadly in favor
of expansive coverage” and focusing primarily on “whether discrimination
has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of
disability.”156 Next, it cited post-Amendments Act case law recognizing that
while the original ADA required a showing of substantial limitation, the
Amendments Act now encompasses a perceived impairment “whether or
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”157
Applying the statutes and regulations to the facts, the court found a
genuine issue of fact remained with respect to whether the employer
regarded the plaintiff as disabled, and it denied summary judgment.158
Surprisingly, the only evidence the plaintiff offered to defeat summary
judgment was a few statements made by her supervisor.159 The employee
claimed that during a telephone argument with her supervisor, the
supervisor called her “emotionally unstable” and told her she “should get
help.”160 The supervisor’s version of the facts maintained that she only told
the employee she “appeared to be on a bit of an emotional roller coaster and
that no one knew how to act around her.”161 The final support offered by the
court for its decision was the Amendments Act’s instruction that the court
“is not supposed to engage in an extensive analysis of whether [the
plaintiff] is disabled under the ADA,” but instead must focus on whether
discrimination occurred.162 Basically, by applying the relaxed standards for
the “regarded as” prong under the Amendments Act, the court eliminated
the disability requirement under the ADA.
Although financial considerations should not be the deciding factor in
determining how much protection the ADA should afford, the costs of
defending frivolous discrimination suits adds to the logic of adding a
155. See supra Part II.
156. Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *7 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2012)).
157. Id. (quoting Becker v. Elmwood Local Sch. Dist., No. 3:10 CV 2487, 2012 WL
13569, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2012)). The court’s analysis did not, however, mention the
statutory provision stating that transitory and minor impairments cannot qualify an
individual for coverage under the “regarded as” prong. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). Even if
the court considered this statute, the plaintiff suffered from depression and mental problems
for longer than six months, so the court’s conclusion would have remained the same.
158. Snyder, 2012 WL 1493863, at *8.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *4.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *8 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2012)).
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materiality component for coverage under the “regarded as” prong. One
author recently hypothesized that the cost of providing reasonable
accommodations to comply with the newly revised ADA will have an
“economically significant” impact.163 As discussed by the EEOC in its
notice of proposed regulations in 2009, the economically significant
threshold is $100 million spent by employers throughout the country.164
While the EEOC originally predicted that the total economic impact of the
Amendments Act would not rise to this threshold,165 there exists evidence
to the contrary.166 Although accommodations are not required for
individuals claiming only that they have been regarded as disabled, the
Amendments Act could nonetheless create a huge financial burden.167 This
is because, with the ease of surviving summary judgment when bringing a
“regarded as” claim, employers should expect to spend more to defend
discrimination suits past the summary judgment stage than they had to
before the Amendments Act’s effective date.168
Snyder provides an example of courts construing the EEOC’s advice to
“not demand extensive analysis”169 into a default rule that presumes a
disability exists, especially under the “regarded as” prong of disability.170
This analysis is inconsistent with Congress’s goals in passing the ADA.
Originally, Congress maintained that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals.”171 This purpose cannot be fulfilled unless courts make an
individualized assessment in each disability discrimination suit. No one
should be subjected to discrimination in the workplace based on a

163. Abigail Adams Kline, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act:
Surpassing the “Economically Significant” Threshold, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 251,
252 (2010).
164. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,433 (Sept. 23, 2009) (codified as
amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
165. Id.
166. See Kline, supra note 163, at 252.
167. See id. at 278.
168. See, e.g., Saley v. Caney Fork, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2012);
Snyder v. Livingston, No. 1:11–CV–77, 2012 WL 1493863 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2012); Gaus
v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 09–1698, 2011 WL 4527359 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011).
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2014).
170. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).
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disability, whether it is perceived or actual.172 However, when individuals
with absolutely no disability (even as perceived) are able to reach the trial
stage in a suit based on nothing more than the mere jesting of a supervisor,
they are taking advantage of ADA laws designed to place disabled people
on an equal footing with everyone else. In other words, these frivolous
actions undermine the importance of legitimate claims brought by
employees who have actually suffered disability discrimination or have
been perceived as having an actual disability. Accordingly, some degree of
impairment should be required for employees proceeding solely under the
“regarded as” prong, though the standard should not be as stringent as the
standard used in determining whether an actual disability exists.
C. The Operation of a Major Bodily Function Is a Major Life Activity:
Congress’s Faulty Determination That a Brick Is a Wall
Another novel feature of the Amendments Act is its treatment of the
operation of major bodily functions as major life activities. The
Amendments Act states that major life activities include the operation of
major bodily functions and creates a nonexhaustive list of qualifying bodily
functions.173 The EEOC subsequently expanded this list and clarified that
the operation of major bodily functions also “includes the operation of an
individual organ within a body system.”174 There seems to be no limit on
which bodily functions are covered under this standard. When considering
the admirable goals of the Amendments Act,175 one may question whether
this part of the Act is well calculated to redress the injustices caused by
disability discrimination, namely “den[ying] people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities
for which our free society is justifiably famous.”176 Adding “the operation
of . . . major bodily function[s]” into the analysis is overinclusive and is a
deviation from what Congress originally intended when it stated that a
172. The “regarded as” prong was “originally intended to express Congress’s
understanding that ‘unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about
disabilities are often just as disabling as actual impairments.’” Interpretive Guidance on Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (2014).
Significantly, “mistaken beliefs” or prejudices are not implicated when the supervisor does
not actually believe the employee has any type of disability (or does not treat the employee
in such a way), like in Snyder.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (including “assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [disabled] individuals”).
176. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
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disability exists when an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.177
The functioning of some bodily systems has no bearing on whether an
employee is disabled, or more specifically, whether a major life activity is
substantially limited. For example, the common cold affects, among other
things, the operation of the immune system. Should that mean that any
person who has contracted the common cold is disabled within the meaning
of the ADA? Surely not. The primary focus should be whether an
impairment “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a
major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,”178
not whether an individual is exhibiting the symptoms or side effects of his
impairment. In determining that the symptoms of a person’s impairment
substantially limit his major life activities, the Amendments Act “confuses
the ADA’s concern for particular outcomes—‘equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency’ for people
with disabilities—with a concern that persons with disabilities function
normally.”179
Nowhere has the Amendments Act purported to protect every person
with any type of impairment from discrimination in the workplace. Instead,
it has sought only to protect disabled people from the “unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice” that hinder such people from
gaining equal employment opportunities with the rest of society.180
Therefore, only major life activities—those that have some minimal
importance to an employee’s daily activities—should be relevant in
considering whether that person has a disability.
In some cases, courts have found a disability based solely on an
impairment’s impact on a major bodily function, even though the
impairment did not appear to substantially limit a major life activity.181
Such was the case in Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., where the
court granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the
sole issue that painful lumps and an unusual discharge from her breasts
qualified her as actually disabled under the Amendments Act.182 Although
the plaintiff undoubtedly experienced pain, the lumps were not cancerous,
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
179. Jones, supra note 43, at 678-79.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012).
181. See, e.g., Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1374-76
(N.D. Ga. 2012).
182. Id. at 1368-69.
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were removed through surgery, and did not seem to limit any major life
activity.183 In other words, the plaintiff’s condition did not seem to impair
her ability to work or conduct any other life activity, much less
“substantially limit[] [such an activity] as compared to most people in the
general population.”184 If the Amendments Act had not included the
operation of major bodily functions as a major life activity, the plaintiff in
Coker would likely have failed to receive summary judgment on the issue
of disability,185 an outcome presumably inevitable under the original
ADA’s requirement that only the substantial limitation of major life
activities qualifies an individual as disabled.186
The inclusion of major bodily functions under the umbrella of major life
activities is a deviation from the original conception of the ADA. Although
it will increase coverage of individuals under the ADA, it does so at a cost.
This approach abandons the threshold determination of disability
discrimination suits, which is whether the employee is a disabled person.187
The operation of major bodily functions often has no bearing on the
activities that are even somewhat important to an individual’s everyday life.
Otherwise, what is the significance in the original ADA’s
pronouncement, unaltered by the Amendments Act, that disabled people are
those who have “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities?”188 Just like in the substantial limitation
analysis, the complete dilution of the common sense meaning of words like
“major” and “substantial” will continue to confuse federal courts charged
with implementing the Amendments Act. The coherence of the ADA’s
understanding of a disabled person is “of critical importance because as a
threshold issue it determines whether an individual is covered by the
ADA.”189 Therefore, the analysis should focus on activities important to an
individual’s daily life because those concerns will legitimately separate
those who are “disabled” under the ADA and those who are not. Then, the
ADA’s goals of “assur[ing] equality of opportunity, full participation,

183. See id.
184. Id. at 1375 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012)).
185. See id. at 1375-76.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
187. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
189. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (2014).
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V. An Additional Hurdle Moving Forward: What Remnants of ADA Case
Law Remain After the Amendments Act?
Congress explicitly stated that the Amendments Act superseded the
rationales of two Supreme Court cases,191 Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.,192 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.193
Congress specifically rejected Sutton’s requirement that “whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” and its
requirement that an employer must perceive an employee as substantially
limited in a major life activity for the plaintiff to succeed in bringing a
claim under the “regarded as” prong of disability.194 The Amendments Act
also rejected the Supreme Court’s following rationale in Toyota:
[T]he terms “substantially” and “major” . . . “need to be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled,” and that to be substantially limited in performing a
major life activity under the ADA “an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives.”195
The stated rationales employed by the Supreme Court in Toyota and Sutton
were superseded because they sharply “narrowed the broad scope of
protection [Congress originally] intended . . . [under] the ADA, thus
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to
protect.”196
One relevant question that has not previously been posed, however, is
whether the remaining portions of these Supreme Court decisions should
still be cited as good law, assuming of course that the forbidden rationales
are not being cited specifically. Neither the regulations nor the Interpretive
190.
191.
3554.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. 3553,
527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
§ 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
Id. § 2(b)(4) (quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197, 198).
Id. § 2(a)(4).
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Guidance provide an answer to this question, but several post-Amendments
Act courts have cited Sutton or Toyota in opinions applying the
Amendments Act.197 One such case is Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease
Ownership.198 In this case, the district court quoted Sutton for its analysis of
the major life activity of working: “To be substantially limited in the major
life activity of working . . . one must be precluded from more than one type
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.”199 Oddly enough,
this standard from Sutton conforms quite well to the current Interpretive
Guidance of the EEOC’s regulations. Those guidelines state that
“[d]emonstrating a substantial limitation in performing the unique aspects
of a single . . . job is not sufficient to establish that a person is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.”200 Because both Sutton and
the guidelines are similar in this situation, the end result would probably
have been the same regardless of which rule the court applied.
Different results have been reached by courts interpreting the continued
vitality of Toyota’s premise that temporary disabilities do not qualify for
coverage under the “actual disability” prong of the ADA.201 In Feldman v.
Law Enforcement Associates Corp., the court opted to defer to the
Amendments Act’s guidance that the “definition of disability is to be
construed ‘in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum
extent permitted’ by the law.”202 The plaintiff survived the employer’s
motion for summary judgment because the court distinguished the
plaintiff’s impairment from the examples listed in the proposed federal
regulations at the time, representing temporary conditions usually found to
not substantially limit major life activities.203
In Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., however, the district court did not even
acknowledge the broad goals of the Amendments Act. Recognizing that
only the principal holding of Toyota had been overturned, the court decided
that Toyota’s incidental holding that “an impairment that only moderately
197. See, e.g., Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL
3815332, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012) (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492); Wurzel v.
Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010)
(citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199).
198. 2012 WL 3815332, at *4.
199. Id. (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492).
200. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(5) and (6) (2014).
201. Compare Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 485
(E.D.N.C. 2011), with Wurzel, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5.
202. 779 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012)).
203. Id.
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or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life
activities is not a substantial limitation under the ADA” remained good
law.204 Therefore, the court reasoned that according to Toyota, the
plaintiff’s sporadic angina spasms, which cause dizziness, shortness of
breath, fatigue, and tightness of the chest, did not place the plaintiff under
the coverage of the Amendments Act.205
Neither the Amendments Act nor accompanying EEOC regulations
appear to forbid either of the approaches taken in these illustrative cases.
Courts may defer to the broad purposes of the Amendments Act and choose
to reject the incidental holdings of Toyota, like the court did in Feldman, or
they may choose to retain them, like the court did in Wurzel. For purposes
of consistency, though, courts should follow the same approach. This
Comment suggests that the Wurzel court took the proper approach.
Congress chose to only invalidate one specific holding in Toyota and two
discrete holdings in Sutton,206 rather than to baldly state that the cases are
no longer good law. So, as long as courts cite material from Sutton and
Toyota that is consistent with the current statutes and federal regulations
and unconnected to the standards denounced in the Amendments Act,
federal courts are free to do so in their own discretion. As shown in Mota,
because the major life activity of working analysis in Sutton is substantially
similar to current EEOC regulations, following the Amendments Act and
Sutton in this realm are synonymous undertakings.207
On a broader level, there are many remaining case law formulas and
standards (entirely separate from Sutton and Toyota) that lower federal
courts created as guiding principles in the analysis of the three prima facie
determinations in ADA discrimination suits. One example of such a
surviving principle comes from McDaniel v. Piedmont Independent School
District No. 22.208 In McDaniel, the district court reiterated a standard
created by the Tenth Circuit in 2004 concerning the qualified individual
analysis and how employers determine which functions are essential to a
job position.209 McDaniel made clear that the Tenth Circuit’s pre204. Wurzel, 2010 WL 1495197, at *7 n.5 (citing Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199).
205. Id. at *10.
206. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat.
3553, 3554.
207. Mota v. Aaron’s Sales & Lease Ownership, No. 11–4298, 2012 WL 3815332, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2012).
208. No. CIV–11–373–M, 2012 WL 1227154 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2012).
209. Id. at *3 (citing Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1118-20 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
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Amendments Act standard survived the passage of the Amendments Act,
affirming that “[i]n cases arising under the ADA, [courts] do not sit as a
super personnel department that second guess employers’ business
judgments.”210 Because Congress left the qualified individual analysis
unchanged from its pre-Amendments Act form, there seems to be no
legitimate reason for denying lower federal courts, like the one in
McDaniel, the discretion to apply such principles as they see fit (unless, of
course, they are bound by conflicting standards created by a court with
binding authority).
When Congress passed the Amendments Act, it consciously reversed the
trend of the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the ADA.211
However, through its silence, Congress seems to have implicitly left all of
the other lower federal court formulas intact. If Congress sought to
eliminate all of this case law interpreting the ADA, it would have done so.
But because it chose to forgo this opportunity, the most logical explanation
is that federal courts are still bound by all case law under the original ADA,
so long as the standards used are consistent with the principles of the
Amendments Act and the current statutes and regulations. This presents a
high degree of latitude for judges in the lower federal courts. In light of
Congress’s focus on the disability determination, standards previously
adopted by courts in handling the qualified individual, direct threat, and
causation doctrines, just to name a few, will most likely continue in their
previous forms since their analyses are somewhat removed from the
disability determination. The next few years will reveal which standards are
consistent with the spirit of the Amendments Act and federal judges’ sense
of justice in administering the Act.
VI. Conclusion
The Amendments Act served as a much needed piece of legislation to
help correct the inequities that disabled workers have historically faced in
the workplace. Although inherent tension exists within the Amendments
Act’s purposes and the existing statutory language, the new system
substantially lessens the nearly insurmountable standards created by federal
courts under the original ADA.
As the survey of cases in the Amendments Act study reveals, summary
judgment is granted less often under the Amendments Act than under the
original ADA, allowing courts to consider the other elements of a plaintiff’s
210. Id. (quoting Mason, 357 F.3d at 1122).
211. See § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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prima facie claim. Moreover, the statistics indicate that the qualified
individual determination is now the most prevalent basis on which
summary judgment is granted. Consequently, written job requirements will
play an ever-increasing role in employment discrimination suits. In
addition, the EEOC should be aware of the potential barriers to employment
that could be erected as a result of the increased importance of written job
requirements.
In some ways, the Amendments Act regulations implemented by the
EEOC have maintained standards that sharply conflict with the ADA’s
originally stated purposes. Especially with regard to the current guidance
for making the disability determination, courts are left with two polar
opposites from which to choose: following established precedent under the
ADA versus attempting to comply with the broad, unspecified goals of the
Amendments Act. Additionally, the lack of a materiality requirement for
employees pursuing a claim under the “regarded as” prong and the
inclusion of the operation of major bodily functions as major life activities
are inconsistent with the original ADA’s notion of a “disabled” person.
Until something is done to clarify which analysis courts should use to
determine whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life
activity, there will be a lack of uniformity among the federal courts.
Because Congress has already spent considerable time and effort to amend
the ADA once, the EEOC is the most likely source for any changes in the
implementation of the Amendments Act in the near future—assuming the
Supreme Court refrains from stepping in again. The EEOC has the most
flexibility and has already updated the accompanying federal regulations
and Interpretive Guidance numerous times. Thus, EEOC regulations should
retain the “substantial limitation” requirement in order to avoid another
search for the meaning of a different unspecified term. Congress
purposefully chose that phrase when it adopted the ADA. To continue this
concept while implementing the broad goals of the Amendments Act, the
EEOC needs to offer courts affirmative guidance for conducting the
disability analysis. This can be achieved through the adoption of the
“materially restricting” analysis suggested by Representatives Hoyer and
Sensenbrenner in the legislative history of the Amendments Act.
Most notably, the Amendments Act has substantially lessened the barrier
to employees proving they are disabled under the ADA. While the limited
case law has shown a glimpse of the Amendments Act’s effect, only time
will tell whether its benefits ultimately outweigh its costs.
Andrew E. Henry
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